Kate got her start in the yachting industry working as crew. She spent five years cruising the Bahamas, Caribbean, New England, and Central America, then segued that experience into a career in marine journalism, including stints as editor of Dockwalk and ShowBoats International.
Captain Richard Chadburn on the lessons learned from a rigging failure that killed a crew member in Antigua two years ago.
Farfalla was gearing up to race in her first Superyacht Challenge Antigua. The day before the regatta began, following a safety briefing by the captain, the 104ft performance cruiser set out from Falmouth Harbour on a practice sail. While sailing upwind on a port tack toward Green Island, the yacht slammed into the kind of trough that is common in the waters south of Antigua. In an instant, the padeye on the port quarter failed, and the runner turning block attached to it sprung loose at high speed, striking the back of the head of a crew member sitting between the primary port winches. Three days later, after being airlifted to a hospital in Miami, he sadly succumbed to his injury.
The yacht’s owner commissioned a detailed investigation, and the captain, Richard Chadburn, who believes findings from accidents of this magnitude should be disclosed so everyone can benefit, shared it with Dockwalk.
In short, the U-bolt padeye experienced “fatigue failure,” caused by the cyclic on/off loads of the yacht’s normal operation. It had been weakened over time to the point where only 10 percent of the padeye’s original cross-sectional area was left intact. This vulnerable section, though, lay under the deck, out of view during normal inspection. In addition, the port and starboard runner padeyes were found to have been misaligned to the normal load path of the runners when they were installed. The investigation’s analysis showed that this likely reduced the padeye’s breaking load and maximum working load to just 45 percent of that advertised.
Following the accident, Farfalla worked with Rigging Projects to find a better solution. They installed floating-type padeyes, which allow the load to be taken on at any angle, as opposed to U-bolts, which have to be perfectly aligned to achieve their rated capacity. “Floating padeyes can also handle cyclical loads much better, which is what a runner padeye has to do,” says Captain Richard.
Furthermore, they also used non-destructive testing (NDT) on all load-bearing interfaces between the rig and the boat, dye tested the chainplates and NDT’d principal bolts in the genoa tracks and mainsheet traveler and all winches. “In fact, we replaced most bolts to the winches and tracks where possible,” Richard says, emphasizing that planned maintenance has to encompass not only blocks and winches, but also the bits they’re attached to. “I now consider NDT of principal load points a compulsory job every five years, and I have recommended that class or flag embrace this within their rules.
“I now consider non-destructive testing of all principal load points a compulsory job every five years, and I have recommended that class or flag embrace this within their rules”
“We also changed how we recorded all our ropes and strops and have gone to a barcoded system developed by Rigging Projects; we can scan each strop and line to see when it was made, when it’s due for replacement and what its spec is. The blocks have also been barcoded.”
Captain Jonathan Kline agrees that a more comprehensive system of inspection and replacement needs to be developed for racing superyachts. Jonathan literally wrote the book on superyacht racing safety: as P2’s build captain and head of her racing program for eight years, he used the lessons learned on the racecourse to compile the Racing Safety Manual for the SuperYacht Racing Association (SYRA), and he sees important takeaways from Farfalla’s experience that could be incorporated into the next revision.
“In the Safety Manual I point to the lazy jib sheet as ‘the sleeping dragon.’ I think the running backstay system needs to be highlighted as well, with all components incorporated into a vigorous system of inspection and replacement. There have been other incidents and near-misses with runners.
“Loose hardware like snatch blocks, soft shackles, D-shackles and running rigging and standing rigging often receive the most attention; however, at some point, depending on the age of the yacht, deck hardware installed during construction needs to be incorporated into the one-, three- or five-year maintenance program,” he says.
Regarding padeyes specifically, in addition to specifying floating ones for systems that experience cyclic loading, Jonathan points out that where the solid metal and threads meet — and where Farfalla’s broke — is both the most critical and the hardest area to inspect. “At an annual yard period, consider removing fixed padeyes and highly loaded hardware so that the ‘buried’ portion [threads and fasteners and backing plates] can be checked, NDT’d and either reinstalled, upgraded or replaced,” he says.
Finally, Jonathan acknowledges that even with comprehensive preventative maintenance, and even when the captain and crew are following the playbook in safely ramping up for “full-noise” racing — as Farfalla’s were at the time of the accident — gear can still fail. “Therefore, it is also vitally important for yacht crew to identify no-go areas while racing. The no-go areas are triangles created with highly loaded running rigging that has been deflected before being loaded into a winch. Crew need to pass quickly through these areas or avoid them altogether,” he says, suggesting that the onboard safety officer, required when racing under SYRA, could work with the skipper to identify these areas and build them into the safety plan.
What is most important, Jonathan says, “is that the lessons learned from major gear failures need to be circulated through SYRA — as Captain Richard has done — so each program can incorporate the findings into their safety plans.”